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BIFURCATED TRIALS
tutional rights must not be shut off even by the imposing barriers of
prison walls.
H. HUGH STEVENS, JR.
Constitutional Law-The Right to a Bifurcated Trial
Congress, when passing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
recognized the likelihood that prejudice would result when certain
issues were tried together and authorized the federal courts, in a
civil suit, to order the separate trial of any issue to avoid that prob-
lem.' It would seem that the need to avoid prejudice in a criminal
proceeding, where the life or liberty of the defendant is at stake, is
even greater, but the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain
no comparable provision.2
The likelihood of this type of prejudice was so great in Holmes
v. United States3 that the defense counsel refused as a matter of
trial tactics to raise the issue of the appellant's insanity at the time
the crime was committed. The appellant, after being convicted, filed
a motion under section 2255 of the Judicial Code4 in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia to have his sentence
vacated alleging that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance be-
cause of his failure to assert the insanity defense.5 Counsel testified
that his experience led him to believe that such a defense would be
a most "impractical approach or request to make of a jury," that a
defense of insanity coupled with a defense on the merits would
jeopardize both defenses, and that there would be great difficulty
"without first admitting to the jury that the defendant Holmes was
guilty of all counts before interjecting a defense of insanity.",,
The appellate court found the "trial counsel's appraisal of the
prejudicial effect of the insanity defense on the defense of not guilty
was entirely reasonable," but that this did not mean that the insanity
defense had to be abandoned. The court pointed out that the de-
'FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
2 Such procedure would not be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which authorize courts, "If no procedure is specifically
prescribed by rule . . . [to] proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent
with these rules or any specific statute." FED. R. CRim. P. 57(b).
3363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1965) (Statutory equivalent of habeas corpus).
363 F.2d at 281.
Old. at 282.
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fense counsel could have made a motion for a bifurcated trial and
that the district court, to avoid the prejudice, could have submitted
the issue of guilt to the jury before the introduction of the evidence
bearing on the insanity issue. The court stated:
Relevant considerations upon a request for bifurcation include the
substantiality of Appellant's insanity defense and its prejudicial
effect on other defenses. The court not only has a broad discre-
tion considering bifurcation, but also prescribing its procedure
... and even the impaneling of a second jury to hear the second
stage if this is necessary to eliminate prejudice.7
The court denied retrospective collateral relief in this situation where
the judgment had become final and bifurcation had not been re-
quested at the trial level. It recognized, however, that the issue of
prejudice was a serious one and could be averted in the future if
the remedy of bifurcated trial were "adopted in the sound discretion
of the trial court in the interest of justice."'8
Although the United States Supreme Court has never considered
the insanity situation presented in Holmes, it has recognized a due
process argument where bifurcation was denied by a trial court in an
analogous situation. In Jackson v. Denno9 the court held that the
New York procedure permitting the same jury to determine both
the issue of guilt and also the voluntariness of a confession was un-
constitutional, and that New York must provide the defendant with
an "adequate evidentiary hearing productive of reliable results con-
cerning the voluntariness of his confession" which meets the re-
quirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 °
No United States Circuit Court of Appeals has ever required a
bifurcated trial in a criminal case, but they have recognized the
utility of the device. In United States v. Curry1 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the power of the trial
court to present the question of guilt to the jury and, after a verdict,
to present to the same jury evidence pertaining to the sentence to be
invoked.12 In Frady v. United States" Judge McGowan, in a con-
curring opinion, advocated a bifurcated trial where a jury is to de-
7 Id. at 283.
I1d. at 284.
°378 U.S. 368 (1962).
'Old. at 394.
1358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966).
12 Id. at 915.
'8 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (reversed on other grounds).
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cide guilt and is also given the responsibility of deciding between a
life sentence and death.14
Only a few states have taken affirmative steps toward providing
for a split verdict or bifurcated trial. California,' 5 Connecticut, 16
New York"7 and Pennsylvania 8 have by statute provided for varied
bifurcation procedures, but not in the insanity situation. These
statutes provide for bifurcation on the issues of guilt and punish-
ment and are limited to capital offenses, usually murder. Louisiana
seems to be the only state that has adopted a bifurcation procedure
and later abandoned it. The Louisiana procedure provided for two
different juries whenever the insanity defense was urged in a capital
case. The reason advanced for doing away with this procedure was
that the smaller parishes had trouble supplying the necessary number
of jurors.'
In so far as can be determined, no state appellate court has,
without statutory authority, found occasion to reverse a trial court
for denying a bifurcated trial. However, a rather complex situation
has developed in Texas due to a court interpretation of a state
statute which provides that a defendant who is insane at the time
of trial cannot be tried until he has recovered from his mental ill-
ness.20 The state courts interpreted this provision as requiring a
separate and preliminary hearing on this issue.2' Practical experi-
ence showed that the issue of the defendant's present insanity was
usually involved with the issue of whether he was sane at the time
the crime was committed and that a jury trying the issue of the
defendant's present insanity might also render a verdict on his sanity
at the time of the crime.2 2 Article 521 of the Texas Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure still expressly provides that evidence of the defen-
dant's insanity at the time of the crime is admissible under a plea
of "not guilty." The result is that two different juries pass on the
defendant's sanity and if either finds him insane at the time of the
,Id. at 91.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-10 (Supp. 1965).
'
7 N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1045, 1045a (Supp. 1966).
18 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
"Bennett, Louisiaza Criminal Procedure-A Critical Appraisal 14 LA.
L. REv. 11 (1953).
"TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 46.02 (1965).
" Morgan v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 76, 117 S.W.2d 76 (1938).
2 Id. at 78, 177 S.W.2d at 77.
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crime he is not guilty.23 Most states have such a provision regarding
the trial of a defendant who is insane at the time of trial, but it is
not likely that any other state court would extend it to require a
bifurcated trial as the Texas Courts did.
The issue of a bifurcated trial as presented in appellant's motion
for collateral relief in Holmes can be expected to become a more
frequent issue at the trial stage. A strong argument can be made
that the denial of bifurcation in such a situation amounts to a denial
of due process similar to the situation in regard to the voluntariness
of confessions. This would seem to be especially true where the
evidence bearing on the insanity issue operates practically as a con-
fession to the commission of the act. For example, suppose a defen-
dant is charged with murder and he urges the insanity defense and
testifies that he had an irresistible impulse to kill the deceased or
that he had heard auditory hallucinations which he believed to be
the voice of God commanding him to kill the deceased victim. It
would seem apparent that after a jury had found the defendant sane,
this testimony could have no other effect than to convince the jury
that he actually committed the crime. Even in situations where the
evidence bearing on sanity has little or no relation to the subsequent
issue of commission of the act, it would still seem to be highly
prejudicial if the defense attempts to meet the burden of showing
by expert testimony, voiced as hypothetical questions and answers,
that the alleged insanity had a causal connection with the crime
committed.
It is submitted that the authority to order a bifurcated trial
should rest in the wide discretion of the trial court. But, as where
similar discretionary functions are involved, the denial of such a
motion, where there is substantial evidence of insanity and sufficient
likelihood that the defendant will be prejudiced, should constitute
reversible error readily rectified by the appellate courts.2 4
BILLY R. BARR
Pena v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 406, 320 S.W.2d 355 (1959). However,
the court held that there was no right of appeal from the preliminary
hearing.
" It should be noted that the argument for setting the judgment aside in
Holnies was based on the supposition that defense counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance. Where reversal is sought on the grounds that the
trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing the motion for bifurcation
would the District of Columbia Circuit Court require more certainty that
prejudice would result from the denial and/or greater substantiality of evi-
dence pertaining to insanity to warrant reversal?
